

16 February 1968

THE GUT ISSUE ON EMERGENCY PLANNING

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Continuity of the Mission of the Director of
Central Intelligence in Time of National Emergency.

REFERENCE : A. Memorandum for Honorable John A. McCone, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency from Kenneth O'Donnell,
Special Assistant to the President, dated 11 April
1963. (TOP SECRET No. 188297)

B. Study on Planning for National Emergency and
Wartime Situations, completed July 1965 by
CIA/Emergency Planning Officer.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest the re-examination of certain factors which would affect the continuity of our mission if increased threats to the national security warranted the invoking of emergency relocation procedures. A detailed discussion of these matters is set forth below, followed by recommendations which are contained in the last paragraph.

2. Specifically, it is believed that the matter of the physical location of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the provisions for carrying out his responsibilities to the President and his role of leadership in the intelligence community under such circumstances should be studied in the light of conditions prevailing today. This necessarily includes consideration of his role as head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the relationship of the Agency to other members of the intelligence community.

3. On 11 April 1963, President Kennedy informed DCI that, in the event of an enemy-provoked national emergency necessitating relocation, he would expect him to report immediately to the OEP Classified Location and remain there until summoned by the President to join him wherever he might be. (Reference A.) Subsequent inquiries made of members of the White House staff following President Johnson's accession, and, again, following his inauguration in his own right, elicited oral responses

SECRET

MEMO: Ex. Dir.-Compt.

SUBJ: Continuity of the Mission of the Director

that he had reaffirmed President Kennedy's policy and standing instructions on this point. We were told that any subsequent change of policy would be communicated to us. I am not aware of any further word on the subject since then.

4. I feel that it would be advisable for us to look into this matter now, in order to make certain there has been no change in presidential plans that, through inadvertence, might not have been made known to us. Before doing so, however, I believe we should first check with DCI in order to be sure that he has not received some direct personal instructions from the President himself since our last inquiries.

5. Although at times in the past we have noted evidence of a latent feeling within the Department of Defense that DCI and CIA would be superseded in time of war by the intelligence services of the military departments, it is to be hoped that by now all parties concerned are aware that the role of DCI as chief intelligence officer of the nation and intelligence advisor to the President and the National Security Council in peacetime, in wartime, and during all conditions of transition between the two is firmly established by statute and by pertinent executive orders and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. (Reference B, Sections 3 and 4, pp. 3 and 4.) If there are any doubts on this point, they should be resolved by mutual understanding before the occurrence of any attack upon the nation.

6. The National Military Command System as conceived by the Department of Defense is not incompatible with the wartime role vested in DCI and CIA. However, it is important that arrangements be made for adequate accommodations for DCI and for CIA personnel necessary to support him at such times as he might be with the President in any of the presidential relocation sites. [redacted] of DDP/IFS made some interesting observations along this line during our participation in exercise [redacted] 1967. I understand that he will include these in a memorandum which he is preparing for your information.

7. I believe it would be advisable for us to make an internal survey to determine the number and types of personnel who would be needed by DCI to support him upon relocation to the presidential emergency sites. Thereafter, we will be in position to negotiate for space, equipment, and facilities at the various sites to carry out this objective. A conference which I had on 8 November 1967 with [redacted] who is the

25X1

25X1

MEMO: Ex. Dir.-Compt.

SUBJ: Continuity of the Mission of the Director

-3

continuity of Operations Officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), leads me to believe that DIA would be inclined to cooperate with us as regards space and facilities at Fort Ritchie, and, insofar as possible, at the command posts afloat and aloft. [] came to the same conclusion after discussions which he had with DIA representatives last November while [] 1967 was in progress. I also have reason to believe that any request to enlarge our present quota of five spaces at the OEP Classified Location would be favorably considered by OEP upon our showing justification therefor.

25X1

3. The following recommendations are submitted for your consideration:

- a. That DCI be advised that we propose to ascertain the President's current policy on the location of DCI in the event of an enemy-provoked national emergency necessitating relocation.
- b. That we make an internal survey to determine the number and types of personnel and the type facilities and equipment needed by DCI to support him upon relocation to the various presidential emergency sites.
- c. That, upon completion of the steps described above in a and b, we establish appropriate policy on the subject and make plans for effecting it.

15/

25X1

CIA-EPO:MWB/eph

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee

1 - DDP/NPS (Attn: [])

1 - DDI (Attn: Mr. [])

1 - SPA/DDS

1 - DDS&T

✓2 - CIA-EPO Chrono & Subject Files